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This paper combines data-driven and model-driven methods for real-time misinformation detection. Our
algorithm, named Q_uickStop, is an optimal stopping algorithm based on a probabilistic information spread-
ing model obtained from labeled data. The algorithm consists of an offline machine learning algorithm for
learning the probabilistic information spreading model and an online optimal stopping algorithm to detect
misinformation. The online detection algorithm has both low computational and memory complexities. Our
numerical evaluations with a real-world dataset show thatQ_uickStop outperforms existing misinformation
detection algorithms in terms of both accuracy and detection time (number of observations needed for detec-
tion). Our evaluations with synthetic data further show thatQ_uickStop is robust to (offline) learning errors.
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1 INTRODUCTION
The proliferation of misinformation [20] (colloquially known as “fake news”) on online social net-
works has become one of the greatest threats to our national security, has eroded the public trust in
news media, and is an imminent threat to the ecosystem of online social platforms like Facebook,
Twitter and Sina Weibo. For example, in 2013, a fake tweet claiming that the then US President
Barack Obama was injured by explosives from a hacked Twitter account of the Associated Press
caused a 150-point drop of the Dow Jones in just two minutes;1 and fake news in the 2016 US
Presidential Election has led to increased political and social polarization and posed a great threat
to democracy. Social media companies, such as Facebook and Twitter, are now taking multiple
1https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/04/23/that-tipped-stock-market-by-136-billion-is-it-terrorism/
Authors’ addresses: Honghao Wei, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, 85287, hwei30@asu.edu; Xiaohan Kang, Uni-
versity of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, Illinois, 61820, Veggente@gmail.com; WeinaWang, Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 15213, weinaw@cs.cmu.edu; Lei Ying, Arizona State University, Tempe, Arizona, 85287,
lei.ying.2@asu.edu.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee
provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and
the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be
honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists,
requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from permissions@acm.org.
© 2019 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
2476-1249/2019/6-ART41 $15.00
https://doi.org/10.1145/3326156
Proc. ACM Meas. Anal. Comput. Syst., Vol. 3, No. 2, Article 41. Publication date: June 2019.
41:2 H. Wei et al.
countermeasures to combat misinformation as the proliferation of misinformation is driving users
away from these platforms.
Despite the enormous attention it receives and the tremendous efforts from both public and pri-
vate institutions to counter it, misinformation detection remains a daunting task as of today. On-
line platforms and news organizations have experimented different methods. Facebook launched
its fact-checking project in Spring 2018 to work with third-party publishers to validate facts and
accuracy of news articles.2 The New York Times has recently published a tip form so that its read-
ers can report misinformation and fake news.3 The third-party fact-checkingmethod is often very
effective for detecting whether a specific news article is fake or not, but clearly is not a scalable
solution and cannot cover even a tiny fraction of news articles and tweets (there are about 500
million tweets per day on Twitter). The crowdsourcing approach used by New York Times is more
scalable, but the reports are not always trustworthy because anyone can send a tip. In light of these
challenges, machine-learning and data-mining approaches have emerged to tackle misinformation
detection in a systematic way (see [36] for a comprehensive review). It has been shown in [4] that
the features extracted from the content of a news article, the features of the users who spread the
news, and the connections of these users can be effectively utilized for misinformation detection.
These are exciting discoveries and progresses because “machine-based” methods are much more
scalable than “human-based” methods, and can handle a vast number of news articles in a short
period of time.
While machine-learning approaches address the scalability issue, another important aspect of
misinformation detection, speed or sample complexity (the amount of time or the number of ob-
servations needed to detect misinformation), has yet to be tackled. Speed is important because of
the disruptive nature of misinformation, which often causes significant damages in a very short
period of time. For example, it only took less than two minutes to tip the Dow Jones by 150 points
with one single fake tweet. Therefore, it is imperative to detect misinformation at the earliest time
so that proper countermeasures can be taken to suppress it. A fact-checking approach may take a
few hours because fact-checkers need to gather facts and evidence to validate or invalidate a news
article. Therefore, the speed aspect of misinformation detection is equally important as accuracy
and scalability in the design of misinformation detection algorithms.
Motivated by the discussions above, this paper focuses on quickest detection of misinformation.
The goal is to develop an algorithm that addresses the three important considerations in misin-
formation detection: scalability, accuracy and speed. Note that existing machine-learning-based
approaches have demonstrated a strong correlation between user features and the spreading mod-
els under different information types (real or fake). We will demonstrate this strong correlation
in Section 2 using a Sina Weibo dataset. The signal of a single retweet is often very weak and
usually not sufficient for classifying a news article with a reasonable accuracy. But this accuracy
can be improved with more and more weak signals. This paper views the problem of misinforma-
tion detection as a sequential hypothesis testing problem. As the platform receives a sequence of
weak signals in real time, it determines whether it has collected enough information to declare
the type of the news (real or fake). The more signals collected, the more accurate the detection
result will be, but then we are at risk of letting the misinformation spread. Enlightened by these
observations, we proposeQ_uickStop, a scalable algorithm that performs accurate, quick detection
of misinformation.Q_uickStop combines a data-driven approach with a model-driven approach in
the following way.
2https://www.facebook.com/help/1952307158131536?helpref=faq_content
3https://www.nytimes.com/2018/09/17/technology/disinformation-tipsheet.html
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• Data-based probabilistic modeling: Since each retweet is a weak signal for the hypothe-
sis testing (whether the news article is real or fake), extracting the statistics of these weak
signals is important for establishing an effective probabilistic model for hypothesis testing.
Q_uickStop first uses an SVM (Support Vector Machine) algorithm to extract an edge-based
probabilistic information spreading model. Section 2 explains the rationale behind the edge-
based model (compared with a node-based model) and shows the effectiveness using the
Sina Weibo dataset.
• Model-based quickest detection: After establishing the probabilistic model, we formulate
the quickest misinformation detection problem as an optimal stopping problem. Specifically,
we propose a cost model that includes both the cost due to detection error and the cost due
to the propagation of misinformation. Note that the propagation cost occurs only in the
case of misinformation. With this formulation, the goal is to discover a stopping policy, i.e.,
a policy that determines when to stop collecting observations and what type to declare after
stopping, that minimizes the overall cost. As more observations are collected, the error cost
decreases but the propagation cost could increase in the case of misinformation. Therefore,
the optimal stopping policy needs to balance the detection accuracy and detection time so
that misinformation can be detected confidently at the earliest possible time.
The main contributions of this paper are summarized below.
• Problem Formulation: We formulate the quickest misinformation detection problem as
a Markov optimal stopping problem based on a probabilistic information spreading model.
This probabilistic model can be extracted from training datasets by given classifiers. An in-
teresting feature of our formulation is the asymmetric cost functions between real news and
misinformation — spreading misinformation causes far more damage than spreading real
news so we need to act quickly only in the case of misinformation. The analytical solution
of a Markov optimal stopping problem in general requires computing a function of the state
(see, e.g., Chapter 3.4.4 on Page 59 of [30]). Since the state in our formulation includes the
current time index (i.e., how many users the article has reached), this function would be
time-dependent. Effectively, this means that we potentially need a different function of the
collected information for each time step. However, utilizing structures in our probabilistic
model, we show that the optimal stopping policy has a simple threshold form described by
several time-independent thresholds. We comment that this structure is similar to that in the
solution of the sequential testing problem, but the techniques there do not directly apply to
our problem since our cost function has a nonlinear term due to the asymmetry.
• Algorithm and Analysis: We propose an algorithm namedQ_uickStop that detects misin-
formation based on edge types, where an edge is a connection between two individuals along
which a piece of information spreads from one individual to the other.Q_uickStop consists of
two parts: (i) Q_uickStop-Training, an offline algorithm that classifies edges into four types
and then calculates transition probabilities between different edge types, where the transi-
tion probabilities in the case of real news may be different from those for misinformation;
and (ii) Q_uickStop-Detection, an online detection algorithm with low computational and
memory complexities. We emphasize that the main computation load is in the offline part.
Once the offline training is completed, the online part for detection is very efficient as de-
scribed below. Q_uickStop-Detection maintains a scalar variable that describes the current
state, and updates the state for each new observation. The update just follows a simple for-
mula and its complexity does not depend on how many observations have been collected.
Then the algorithm compares the state with several thresholds calculated offline. Based on
the comparison result, it decides whether it will keep collecting observations or declare the
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type of the information. In the latter case, what type to declare is also determined by the com-
parison result. Therefore, Q_uickStop-Detection has very low computational and memory
complexities, and is ideal for real-time large-scale misinformation detection.
• Evaluations: We evaluated the performance of Q_uickStop using both a real-world so-
cial network dataset (from Sina Weibo) and synthetic data. The evaluations on the real-
world dataset demonstrates the effectiveness of our algorithm in terms of both accuracy and
speed compared with state-of-the-art real-time misinformation algorithms. Under Q_uick-
Stop with a low propagation cost, it took 12 observations on average in the Weibo dataset
to detect misinformation, but more to declare real news. This is consistent with the asymmet-
ric cost model. Furthermore, the false negative rate (misinformation classified as real news)
is much lower than the false positive rate (real news classified as misinformation), which
is also desirable in practice. In contrast, the accuracy of the state-of-the-art early detection
algorithms are still lower than ours even with 33×more observations. From the evaluations
on synthetic data, we further observed thatQ_uickStop is robust to classification errors.
We finally comment that while several early misinformation detection algorithms have been
developed [6, 23–26, 48], these algorithms either use a fixed number of observations as input [6, 26]
or observations over a fixed time period as input [23–25, 48]. Therefore, these early detection
algorithms do not minimize the detection time (or the number of observations) in real time. Our
approach, on the other hand, tackles the problem using the optimal stopping method and optimizes
the number of observations needed in real-time for quickest detection. Our numerical evaluations
showQ_uickStop achieves higher accuracy with fewer observations due to the dynamic nature of
the algorithm. A detailed review of other related work is presented in Section 7.
2 MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We model an online social network as a graph G = (V, E), where V is the set of vertices rep-
resenting users and E is the set of directed edges representing the connections between users.
Information (real news or misinformation) can spread from one user to another via the edge con-
necting them, e.g., a Twitter user can retweet a post from one of her/his followees. In this paper,
we adopt the terminology of Twitter. Given a directed edge (v,u), user u is called a follower of
user v ; and user v is called a followee of user u. Information can spread from user v to user u via
this directed edge.
We assume two types of information that may spread in the network: real news articles (simply
called news in the remainder of the paper) andmisinformation. A user (say user u) decides whether
to post (retweet) the information based on the following three factors: (i) the type of the informa-
tion, (ii) the features of user u, and (iii) the set of user u’s neighbors who have posted (retweeted)
the information before user u.
As information spreads in the network, the platform obtains sequential observations (weak sig-
nals) for misinformation detection. In this paper, a retweet is considered to be an observation,
which is represented by the edge over which this retweet occurs. Specifically, we define the kth
observation to be (Vk ,Uk ),whereUk is the feature vector of thekth user who retweets the informa-
tion and Vk is the feature vector of the followee from whom the kth user retweets the information.
We remark that when complete network and information diffusion information is known, the in-
formation spreading trace is likely to be a tree or a forest (with multiple information sources).
However, in practice, it is often not the case because of missing information and partial observa-
tions [15, 18]. Therefore, the observations we have are a sequence of retweets (Vk ,Uk ), which not
necessarily form a tree. In particular, Uk is not necessarily the same as Vk+1 in the trace. Now to
model these retweets as weak signals, we can consider the following two approaches.
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• User-based Model: In the user-based model, given the type of an article, the probability a
user retweets the article depends on the features of the user. Intuitively, an honest user has
a lower probability to retweet some misinformation than a malicious user (e.g., a bot). The
user-based model is to classify the users based on the user features with a labelled training
dataset.
• Edge-basedModel: In the edge-basedmodel, we view each edge as a communication channel
and classify edges into different groups. For example, misinformation is more likely to spread
over an edge between two malicious socialbots than an edge between two honest users. The
edge-based model is to classify the edges based on the edge features (the feature vectors of
the two end users (V,U)) with a labelled training dataset.
Figure 1 presents the distributions of SVM classification scores of the user-based model and the
edge-based model of the Weibo dataset released in [24], where x-axis is the classification score
of the SVM classifier, and y-axis is the score distributions (frequencies). A user or an edge with a
higher score is considered more likely to spread misinformation. From the figure, we first observe
that the scores of users (or edges) involved in spreading news concentrate around zero while the
scores of users (or edges) involved in spreading misinformation concentrate around one. This
demonstrates a strong correlation between article types and user/edge features. Furthermore, we
can see that the score distributions based on edges exhibit a stronger correlation with article types
than the score distributions based on users. For example, for misinformation, the score distribution
based on edges has a higher frequency around zero than that based on users (60% versus 45%).
Because of this observation, in this paper, we use the edge-based model.
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Fig. 1. Classification distribution
We assume that given the article type, the sequential observations form a Markov chain as
shown in Figure 2, where we further assume the edge feature vector (V,U) can be classified into
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four classesZk = f (Vk ,Uk ) ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} to simplify themodel, where 0 is the type of edges that are
most likely to be used for spreading news and 3 is the type of edges that are most likely to be used
for spreading misinformation. Under this Markov chain model, besides the edge types, additional
parameters to be learned are the transition probabilities, denoted by αi (Zk |Zk−1),where i ∈ {0, 1},
i = 0 indicates these are the transition probabilities when spreading news, and i = 1 indicates
these are the transition probabilities when spreading misinformation. When α0(·|·) and α1(·|·) are
different, we can detect misinformation using sequential hypothesis testing. We remark that the
generalization of the four-class model to aC-class model for a finiteC is straightforward. Our main
results and the proposed algorithm work for any finite C . The choice of the number of classes, C ,
however, needs to balance the detection performance, which favors a larger C, and the training
complexity and accuracy, which often favor a smaller C . We adopt the four-class model based on
experimental evaluations on the Weibo dataset. The evaluations showed that the four-class model
performs significantly better than a two-class model, but increasing C from four to eight did not
yield any noticeable improvement.
...(V1,U1) (V2,U2) (V3,U3)
f(VK,UK)  {0, 1, 2, 3}
Fig. 2. A Markov chain model for sequential observations
Tables 1 and 2 show the empirical transition probability matrices under news and misinforma-
tion obtained from the Weibo dataset (an edge with a classification score below 0.25 is placed in
class 0, one with score between 0.25 and 0.5 is placed in class 1, one with score between 0.5 and
0.75 is placed in class 2, and one with score above 0.75 is placed in class 3). We can clearly observe
that the observations are not i.i.d., which supports our edge-based Markovian model.
0 1 2 3
0 0.828 0.120 0.039 0.012
1 0.651 0.224 0.084 0.041
2 0.500 0.193 0.191 0.116
3 0.279 0.181 0.211 0.329
Table 1. Edge Transition Probability Matrix under News from the Weibo Dataset
0 1 2 3
0 0.163 0.167 0.249 0.421
1 0.105 0.194 0.239 0.461
2 0.080 0.119 0.277 0.524
3 0.052 0.088 0.203 0.657
Table 2. Edge Transition Probability Matrix under Misinformation from the Weibo Dataset
For the edge classifier, we leverage the existing research, in particular, the research in [18],
where it shows that SVM performs the best among several popular machine-learning algorithms,
including decision tree and random forest for classifying misinformation. We adopt SVM and the
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user features proposed in [4] to obtain an edge classifier. The details can be found in Section 4. After
classifying the edges in the training data, we further obtain transition probabilities αi (Zk |Zk−1)
from the training data to build a probabilistic information spreading model (details can be found
in Section 3).
Our focus is on the quickest detection formulation after training the edge classifier and learn-
ing the transition probabilities αi (Zk |Zk−1). In the next section, we will formulate the quickest
misinformation detect problem and prove that the problem is a Markov optimal stopping time
problem and its solution is a time-invariant threshold policy. Furthermore, the thresholds can be
efficiently calculated offline based on the probabilistic model. The online algorithm is of constant
computational and memory complexities, and is very easy to implement.
3 OPTIMAL STOPPING APPROACH FOR QUICKEST MISINFORMATION DETECTION
Consider an online social network platform that is monitoring the spread of some information in
the network. We say that an event occurs when a user retweets or posts the information. When
the kth event occurs, we obtain an observation Zk ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} by using the trained classifier
to learn the edge type. Furthermore, we assume that we have learned the transition probabilities
αi (Zk |Zk−1) from training data.
With the model introduced above, the detection of misinformation can be formulated as a hy-
pothesis testing problem with the following two hypotheses:
• H0: The information is news. In this case, {Zk } is a four-state Markov process with transition
probabilities α0(Zk |Zk−1).
• H1: The information is misinformation. Then {Zk } is a four-state Markov process with tran-
sition probabilities α1(Zk |Zk−1).
Given observations {Zk }, the misinformation detection problem is to determine whether H0 or
H1 is true. We assume that in terms of the prior distribution, hypothesisH0 occurs with probability
π0 and H1 occurs with probability π1 = 1 − π0. We assume the first observation Z1 is uniformly
distributed over {0, 1, 2, 3} regardless of the hypothesis.
Now define
Πk = Pr (H1 |(Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zk )) , (1)
so
1 − Πk = Pr (H0 |(Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zk )) .
According to the Bayes rule, we have
Πk = Pr (H1 |(Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zk ))
=
Pr ((Z1,Z2, · · · ,Zk )|H1)Pr(H1)
Pr(Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zk )
=
π1
∏k−1
i=1 α1(Zi+1|Zi )
(1 − π1)
∏k−1
i=1 α0(Zi+1|Zi ) + π1
∏k−1
i=1 α1(Zi+1|Zi )
.
From the equation above, we have
1 − Πk
Πk
=
(1 − π1)
∏k−1
i=1 α0(Zi+1|Zi )
π1
∏k−1
i=1 α1(Zi+1|Zi )
,
which implies that
1 − Πk+1
Πk+1
=
1 − Πk
Πk
α0(Zk+1 |Zk )
α1(Zk+1 |Zk )
.
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Therefore, we have the following recursive equation
Πk+1 =
Πkα1(Zk+1 |Zk )
(1 − Πk )α0(Zk+1 |Zk ) + Πkα1(Zk+1 |Zk )
. (2)
for updating our belief on H1.
Note that given the observation sequence {Zk },we can calculate
1−Πk
Πk
in real time. The question
is when to declare the type of the information. The more observations we have, the more accurate
the decision would be but the more widely the information would have spread. Therefore, we need
to balance the accuracy and the potential damage of spreading misinformation. Let T ≥ 1 denote
the random time at which the type of information is declared, which is a function ofZ1,Z2, · · · ,ZT ;
i.e.,T is a stopping time with respect to {Zk }. Let δT denote the type of information that is declared
by a detection algorithm. We consider the following two types of costs in the misinformation
detection problem.
Error Cost
The first type of cost comes from mis-detection. Let cI denote the cost of type-I error (also called
false positive, where news is declared as misinformation) and cII denote the cost of type-II error
(also called false negative, where misinformation is declared as news). The expected cost of mis-
detection is
ce (δT ) = cI Pr(δT = 1|H0)(1 − π1) + cII Pr(δT = 0|H1)π1,
where π1 is the prior probability of H1.
Propagation Cost
The other type of cost is the propagation cost. Information becomes more influential when more
people share it. So we need to detect misinformation as quickly as we can to limit its potential
damage, while spreading news does not occur any cost. Consequently, the propagation cost in our
model is asymmetric and comes only frommisinformation. In particular, we assume that there is a
cost of c associated with each time slot of propagation if the information is misinformation. Thus,
at the stopping time T , the propagation cost is
E
[
cT IH1
]
,
where IH1 is the indicator function which is equal to 1 when H1 is true and is equal to 0 when H0
is true.
A Markov Optimal Stopping Approach
The goal of the misinformation detection algorithm is to minimize the overall cost. Formally, we
aim to find a stopping timeT and a decision rule δT , both depending on Z1, · · · ,ZT , that solve the
following problem
inf
T ,δT
ce (δT ) + E
[
cT IH1
]
. (3)
An important step for solving this problem is to properly handle the propagation cost termE
[
cT IH1
]
,
which depends on the hypothesis. Note that if this term were E [cT ], this problem would be the
same as the renowned sequential testing problem (see, e.g., [30]). Specifically, the sequential testing
problem solves
inf
T ,δT
ce (δT ) + E [cT ] . (4)
Recall that given IH1 , the observation sequence {Zk } is a Markov chain. Therefore, when we
view IH1 as part of the state, {(IH1 ,Zk )} forms a Markov chain, and thus the formulation (3) is a
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Markov optimal stopping problem. However, this Markov chain is only partially observable since
we cannot observe IH1 . We can transform this optimal stopping problem of a partially observable
Markov chain to a fully observable optimal stopping problem. Specifically, consider the condi-
tional distribution of IH1 given observations Z1,Z2, . . . ,Zk . This conditional distribution can be
represented by the variable Πk defined in (1). We can verify that {(Πk ,Zk )} is a Markov chain.
For the convenience of analysis, we also view the time index k as part of the state and consider
the Markov chain {(Πk ,Zk ,k)}. With this, we transform the optimal stopping problem in (3) to a
Markov optimal stopping problem in Theorem 3.1.
Theorem 3.1. The optimal stopping problem (3) is equivalent to a Markov optimal stopping prob-
lem with respect to the Markov chain {(Πk ,Zk ,k)}. Formally,
inf
T ,δT
ce (δT ) + E
[
cT IH1
]
= inf
T ∈T
E [min{cIIΠT , cI(1 − ΠT )} + cTΠT ] , (5)
where T is the set of stopping times with respect to {(Πk ,Zk ,k)}. 
Note that the variable in the Markov stopping problem (5) is just the stopping timeT instead of
bothT andδT . Therefore, we can find the optimal stopping policy in two steps: first find the optimal
stopping timeT by solving (5), and then find the optimal decision rule δT based on Z1, . . .ZT . Such
a transform from a partially observable Markov chain to a fully observable Markov chain has been
widely used in optimal stopping problems and more generally in Markov decision processes (see,
e.g., Chapter 4.1 in Vol. I of [3], and [46]). Here we include the proof of Theorem3.1 in Appendix A.1
for completeness.
The analytical solution of the Markov optimal stopping problem (5) can be obtained using the
Snell envelope (see, e.g., Chapter 2.2 on Page 38 of [19], and Chapter 3.4.4 on Page 59 of [30]), which,
in general, needs to compute a function of the state and store the function for use in the optimal
stopping policy. In our problem, the state includes the time index k . Then to compute the Snell
envelope, we potentially need a different function of the collected information Πk and Zk for each
nonnegative integer k . Interestingly, in Theorem 3.2, we will see that for our problem, the optimal
stopping policy is a threshold policy on Πk described by 8 time-independent thresholds. This time-
independence property greatly simplifies the computation. The requirement on memory storage
is also minimal, so this policy will be very simple to implement. We comment that compared with
the sequential testing problem, the cost function in our problem has a non-linear term cTΠT . So
the proof for the sequential testing problem does not directly apply to our problem. Nevertheless,
we utilize an essential observation that the process {Πk } is a martingale with respect to {Zk }
and still obtain a time-independent threshold policy. The proof of Theorem 3.2 is presented in
Appendix A.2.
Theorem 3.2. The optimal stopping time T ∗ is
T ∗ = inf
k>0
{
k : Πk <
(
π
(Zk )
l
, π
(Zk )
u
)}
. (6)
In other words, there exist positive values π
(z)
l
, π
(z)
u , (z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}), independent of T , such that
the algorithm declares the information to be news when Zk = z and Πk ≤ π
(z)
l
, and declares the
information to be misinformation when Zk = z and Πk ≥ π
(z)
u . The thresholds π
(z)
l
and π
(z)
u for
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z = 0, 1, 2, 3 are determined by solving the following equations:
π
(z)
l
= sup
π
{
0 ≤ π ≤
cI
cI + cII
 s(z)(π ) = cIIπ
}
(7)
π
(z)
u = inf
π
{
cI
cI + cII
≤ π ≤ 1
 s(z)(π ) = cI(1 − π )
}
(8)
where s is the solution of the Bellman equation below
s(z)(π ) = min
{
д(π ), E
[
s(Zk+1)(Πk+1)
Πk = π ,Zk = z
]
+ cπ
}
(9)
and
д(π ) = min{cIIπ , cI(1 − π )}.

Note E
[
s(Zk+1)(Πk+1)
Πk = π ,Zk = z] in (9) is understood as the expected cost to go starting
from the next time step based on s given the state in the current time step is π and z. In other
words,
E
[
s(Zk+1)(Πk+1)
Πk = π ,Zk = z
]
=
3∑
z′=0
s(z
′)
(
πα1(z
′ |z)
πα1(z′ |z) + (1 − π )α0(z′ |z)
)
(πα1(z
′|z) + (1 − π )α0(z
′|z)) .
So it does not depend on k .
4 QUICKSTOP: THE QUICKEST MISINFORMATION DETECTION ALGORITHM
From the results presented in the previous sections, we propose Q_uickStop, which includes the
following components.
• Training data: Our algorithm needs labeled training data. The dataset should include a
set of information spreading traces which are labeled as news or misinformation. Each user
involved in the information trace has a feature vector. The information should also include
the followee from whom a user retweeted the information.
• Learning the information spreading model via the SVM classifier: Given the labeled
data, we first train an SVM classifier with the dataset that classifies information to news
or misinformation. The input to the SVM classifier is the average feature vector of edges.
Recall that the feature vector of edge (v,u) is (V,U). After training the SVM classifier, we
use the classifier to classify the edges into four groups based on the edge feature vector.
Note that SVM outputs an value between 0 to 1. In our experiments, we use the following
mapping: [0, 0.25] ⇒ 0, (0.25, 0.5] ⇒ 1, (0.5, 0.75] ⇒ 2, and (0.75, 1] ⇒ 3. From the
transition probabilities learned from the previous step, we calculate π
(z)
l
and π
(z)
u according
to Theorem 3.2.
• Quickest detection: When monitoring information spreading, the algorithm updates Πk
according to (2) when an event occurs, where we set Π1 = π1 which is the prior distribution
of hypothesis H1 according to the data. The information is declared to be news when Πk ≤
π
(Zk )
l
and misinformation when Πk ≥ π
(Zk )
u .
We remark that this algorithm combines a data-driven approach, which learns the underlying
probabilistic model of information spreading in networks, and a model-driven approach, which
identifies misinformation in a timely manner with the quickest detection formulation.
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Q_uickStop consists of two parts:Q_uickStop-Training andQ_uickStop-Detection, whose pseudo-
code can be found in Algorithms 1 and 2, respectively.
4.1 Computational and Memory Complexities
In the training part, we use an SVM classifier on n information traces. In SVM, the feature space is
obtained by using some mapping functions and the hyperplane is determined by a set of support
vectors. Then the dimension of the feature space depends on the mapping function. The minimum
computational complexity of training an SVM is O(n2), and may reachO(n3).
The thresholds are calculated using the value iteration method. Let ϵ be the quantization step
size of the state Πk . During the value iteration, the terminal time depends on the quantization
precision. The computational complexity for each iteration is O( 1
ϵ
); the memory complexity is
also O( 1ϵ ). This step is done offline.
For the online misinformation detection part, the computational complexity per iteration and
memory complexity are bothO(1). The algorithm needs to store 8 threshold values and 32 transi-
tion probabilities. Each update of the state Πk only requires a few elementary operations.
5 PERFORMANCE EVALUATION WITH REAL-WORLD DATASETS
We first evaluate the performance of Q_uickStop using the following real-world dataset.
TheWeiboDataset: SinaWeibo is a Chinese microbloggingwebsite similar to Twitter. TheWeibo
dataset we use is the one released in [23], which includes 4,664 labeled information traces from
Sina’s community management center.4 The dataset also includes user information such as the
number of followees, the number of followers, the registration days, etc, which are used as user
features in our algorithm. We remove information traces whose sizes are small. In particular, we
keep the traces in which the information was retweeted by the followers of at least 50 distinct
users. We further balance the dataset by selecting 488 news traces and 488 misinformation traces.
The average retweets per trace is 2,031, the largest trace includes 55,155 retweets, and the smallest
one has 105 retweets. We used 80% of the traces as training data and the remaining as the testing
data.
We compared Q_uickStop with the following misinformation detection algorithms aiming at
early detection: (i) decision-tree-based methods [4]; (ii) SVM-based methods with RBF kernel [45];
(iii) linear SVM-basedmodels for time-series data [24]; (iv) Neural network-basedmethodswith Re-
current Neural Networks (RNNs), or Convolutional Neural Networks (CNNs), or both for sequen-
tial data [22]; and (v) a comprehensive approach involving RNNs, Feedforward Neural Networks
(FNNs), and singular value decomposition (SVD) for low-dimensional feature representation [32].
Note that all these methods are feature-based classification algorithms. The first three algorithms
[4, 24, 45] can take both user features and news content features as input. The algorithm proposed
in [22] has three versions, RNN only, CNN only, and both. The algorithms use the sequential user
features as the input to the neural networks. The algorithm in [32] uses an RNN to extract article
features, an FNN to extract user features, and another FNN to integrate both user and article fea-
tures for classification. Q_uickStop, on the other hand, only uses user features. In the evaluations,
for the first three algorithms, we implemented two versions: one with only user features (i.e., the
same set of user features used in Q_uickStop), and the other with both user and content features
(so more features thanQ_uickStop). The ten different algorithms are summarized below.
• DTCu : A Twitter information credibility method [4] based on decision trees, with only user
features.
4https://service.account.weibo.com
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Algorithm 1Q_uickStop-Training (Offline)
Input:
A set of information traces: E = {e1, e2, · · · , en} ⊲ ei is a sequence of users: {u
(ei )
t }, where t is
the posting order of a user, i is the index of the news trace
A set of labels: l = {l1, l2, · · · , ln} ⊲ li ∈ {0, 1} is the label of ei (0: news, 1: misinformation).
1: For the tth user who post the information i (say user u
(ei )
t ), obtain feature vector of the edge:
(V
(ei )
t ,U
(ei )
t ).
2: Compute U˜(ei ) = 1
|ei |−1
(∑ |ei |
t=2 V
(ei )
t ,
∑ |ei |
t=2 U
(ei )
t
)
⊲ |ei | is the cardinality of news trace ei
3: Train edge classifier: f (·) using SVM with training dataset (U˜, l)
4: Classify edges in the traces, Z
(ei )
t ← f (V
(ei )
t ,U
(ei )
t )
5: Calculate the transition probabilities
α j (z1 |z2) =
∑n
i=1
∑ |ei |−1
t=1 I{Z
(ei )
t+1 =z1,Z
(ei )
t =z2 }
I{li=j }∑n
i=1
∑ |ei |−1
t=1 I{Z
(ei )
t =z2 }
I{li=j }
, z1, z2 ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
6: Initialize ϵ, ϵ0,m ←
1
ϵ
, π = {π 1, · · · , πm}, cI, cII, c ⊲ ϵ and ϵ0 specify the quantization step size
and the convergence tolerance
7: for z = 0, 1, 2, 3 do
8: s
(z)
0 (π
i ) ← min{cIIπ
i
, cI(1 − π
i )}, i = 1, . . . ,m
9: end for
10: for j = 1, 2, . . . do ⊲ Solve the Bellman equation using value iteration
11: д(π i ) = min{cIIπ
i
, cI(1 − π
i )}, i = 1, . . . ,m
12: for z = 0, 1, 2, 3 do
13: s
(z)
1 (π
i ) ← min
{
д(π i ), E
[
s
(z˜)
0 (π˜ )|π
i
, z
]
+ cπ i
}
, i = 1, . . . ,m where
E
[
s
(z˜)
0 (π˜ )|π
i
, z
]
=
3∑
k=0
s
(k)
0
(
π iα1(k |z)
π iα1(k |z) + (1 − π i )α0(k |z)
)
× (π iα1(k |z) + (1 − π
i )α0(k |z))
14: end for
15: if ‖s1(π ) − s0(π )‖ ≤ ϵ0 then
16: break
17: else
18: s0(π ) ← s1(π )
19: end if
20: end for
21: π
(z)
l
← supπ i
{
0 ≤ π i ≤ cI
cI+cII
 s(z)0 (π i ) = cIIπ i
}
, z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
22: π
(z)
u ← infπ i
{
cI
cI+cII
≤ π i ≤ 1
 s(z)0 (π i ) = cI(1 − π i )
}
, z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} ⊲ Compute thresholds
Output:
Edge classifier: f (·)
Transition probabilities: αi (·), i = 0, 1
Thresholds π
(z)
l
and π
(z)
u , z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
• DTCa : A Twitter information credibility method [4] based on decision trees, with both user
and content features.
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Algorithm 2Q_uickStop-Detection (Online)
Input:
Information trace: y = {y1,y2, . . . } ⊲ yt is the tth user in the information trace y
Edge classifier f (·)
Transition probabilities αi (·), i = 0, 1
Thresholds π
(z)
l
and π
(z)
u , z ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3}
1: Initialize Π = π1,k ← 2,Z
(y)
k
= f (V
(y)
k
,U
(y)
k
) ⊲ π1 is the prior of H1 (misinformation)
2: while Π ∈
[
π
(Z
(y)
k
)
l
, π
(Z
(y)
k
)
u
]
do
3: k ← k + 1
4: For each user yk , obtain feature vector of edge: (V
(y)
k
,U
(y)
k
)
5: Z
(y)
k
← f (V
(y)
k
,U
(y)
k
)
6: Π ←
Πα1(Z
(y)
k
|Z
(y)
k−1
)
(1−Π)α0(Z
(y)
k
|Z
(y)
k−1
)+Πα1(Z
(y)
k
|Z
(y)
k−1
)
⊲ Compute Π
7:
8: end while
9: T ← k
10: if Π > π
(Z
(y)
k
)
u then
11: δT = 1
12: else if Π < π
(Z
(y)
k
)
l
then
13: δT = 0
14: end if
Output:
stopping time: T , type of information: δT
• SVM-RBFu : An SVM-based method with RBF kernel [45], with only user features.
• SVM-RBFa : An SVM-based method with RBF kernel [45], with both user and content fea-
tures.
• SVM-TSu : A linear SVM-based [24] method for time-series, with only user features.
• SVM-TSa : A linear SVM-based [24] method for time-series, with both user and content
features.
• PPC_R: A variant of RNN [22] called Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU) for time-series data. The
neural network has 5,000 parameters.
• PPC_C: A CNN based method [22] for time-series data, which has 800 parameters.
• PPC_R+C: A method in [22] that combines RNN and CNN, which has 6,000 parameters.
• CSI: A method proposed in [32] that uses RNN for content feature extraction and FNN for
user feature extraction. The three neural networks have 52,000 parameters in total.
We note that exceptQ_uickStop, all other algorithms mentioned require a pre-determined num-
ber of observations as input.Q_uickStop is an optimal stopping algorithm so it decides the number
of observations needed in real time.
We remark that all the four neural network based methods (PPC_R, PPC_C, PPC_R+C, and CSI)
require a large number of samples for training. Therefore, we used 80% of the entire 4,664 labeled
traces for training the neural networks and then tested the performance on the same testing data
as the other algorithms. The neural network based algorithms performed poorly when using the
smaller training set as that inQ_uickStop.
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Performance Metrics:We considered the following performance metrics.
• Accuracy: the fraction of traces that are correctly identified.
• False positive rate: the fraction of news classified as misinformation.
• False negative rate: the fraction of misinformation classified as news.
• Detection time of news: the average number of events required to declare news.
• Detection time of misinformation: the average number of events required to declare misin-
formation.
5.1 Numerical Results
Evolution ofΠk underQ_uickStop: Figure 3 illustrates the evolution ofΠk on two traces chosen
from the Weibo dataset: one misinformation trace and one news trace. We can see that the upper
threshold becomes smaller and the lower threshold becomes larger when we increase the propa-
gation cost from 0.1 to 0.8, and the algorithm stops earlier when c = 0.8 than when c = 0.1. Also it
takes fewer number of observations to declare misinformation than news. With c = 0.8, it takes 7
observations to declare the misinformation and 18 observations to declare the news. Similar trends
can be observed on most of the traces.
 (news)
 (misinfo)
p(0)L =0.0001
p(3)U =0.9728
P
K
number of posts(c=0.1)
(b)
p(3)U =0.8245
P
K
number of posts(c=0.8)
 (news)
 (misinfo)
p(0)L =0.0093
(a)
Fig. 3. Examples of Πk and stopping time T under QuickStop
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Figures 4 and 5 summarize the performances of Q_uickStop and the other ten algorithms. In
Figure 4, Q_uickStop uses parameters cI = cII = 10 and c = 0.05; and the x-axis is the number of
tweets used by the other ten algorithms, varying from 10 to 500. Note that when the number of
observations in a trace is less than the decision deadline, then the full trace was used as the input.
In Figure 5, we varied the parameter c of Q_uickStop from 0.05 to 1.2 with step size 0.05. In Figure
5, all ten other algorithms used full Weibo traces as input. The key observations are summarized
below.
• High Accuracy: Figure 5 (a) shows that the accuracy of Q_uickStop only with user features
is substantially higher than other algorithms even when other algorithms use both user fea-
tures and content features. Specifically,Q_uickStop with c = 0.05 achieves higher accuracy
than other algorithms with 500 observations with less than 15 observations on average. Un-
derQ_uickStop, as c increases, the accuracy decreases but the number of observations used
decreases as well, which is the trade-off between accuracy and speed.
• Quick Detection: Quickest misinformation detection is the key objective of our algorithm.
Figure 4 shows that the accuracy of Q_uickStop in comparison with the other algorithms.
Q_uickStopwith c = 0.05 achieves an accuracy of 0.93with 15 observations on averagewhile
the accuracies of all other algorithms are lower than 0.93 even with 500 observations. Note
that four of the ten algorithms include content features which are not used inQ_uickStop.
• Low False Negative: In almost all cases, the false negative rate of Q_uickStop is lower than
the false positive rate. This is because with the discriminative propagation cost,Q_uickStop
is more aggressive on declaring misinformation than news in order to minimize the prop-
agation cost. We also remark that CSI, which involves 52,000 parameters, has an accuracy
close toQ_uickStopwhen using entire traces, but its false negative rate is much higher than
Q_uickStop (0.097 versus 0.031).
The experimental results show that Q_uickStop detects misinformation faster and more accu-
rately than other algorithms. We believe it is becauseQ_uickStop specifically models and utilizes
the Markovian structure of the problem, and is based on the optimal stopping rule. The other
algorithms were not optimized for the stopping time, nor do they have theoretical guarantees.
6 EVALUATIONWITH SYNTHETIC DATA
We further evaluate the algorithm with synthetic network and information spreading data. We
construct a network with 500 nodes using the preferential attachment model [38]. Our network
includes two types of nodes: gossipers and messengers, where gossipers are more likely to spread
misinformation than messengers. When a new node joins the network, it is assigned a type uni-
form at random, and then connects to three existing nodes in the network, i.e. forming three
edges. For each edge, the new node first decides whether to connect to a node of the same type
(with probability 0.7) or a node of different type (with probability 0.3). After deciding the type, say
it chooses to connected to a gossiper, the new node selects a gossiper among all existing gossipers
with probability proportional to their degrees. We define the edge types as follows: 0 - (messenger,
messenger), 1 - (gossiper, messenger), 2 - (messenger, gossiper) and 3 - (gossiper, gossiper). We
simulated the information spreading using the continuous-time SI model. For each set of param-
eters, we create 500 traces. Each trace was flagged as news with π0 = π1 = 0.5. The probabilities
that an article is retweet over a given edge under the SI model are summarized in Table 3. From
example, news spreads from a messenger to another messenger with probability 0.9, spreads from
a gossiper to messenger with probability 0.7, misinformation spreads from a messenger to another
messenger with probability 0.1, and from a gossiper to another gossiper with probability 0.9.
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Fig. 4. Performance of Early Misinformation Detection under Different Decision Deadlines (based on the
Weibo Data)
0 1 2 3
News 0.9 0.7 0.3 0.1
Misinformation 0.1 0.2 0.7 0.9
Table 3. Probability of Information Spreading over Different Edge Types
The objective of this evaluation with the synthetic data is to evaluate the robustness of the
online Q_uickStop-Detection with classification errors. With the synthetic data, the edge types
are known so we can control the edge classification errors by random flipping the edge types and
evaluate the performance of Q_uickStop-Detection with respect to classification errors.
Figure 6 shows the performance of Q_uickStopwith different classifcation errors.We introduced
edge classification errors such that the type of an edge is correctly classified with probability γ and
misclassified with probability 1−γ .We varied γ from 0.05 to 0.5. In Figure 6, we used cI = cII = 10
and c = 0.3 forQ_uickStop.
• Robust to Learning Errors: We can observe that even when 50% edges are not correctly
classified,Q_uickStop still has an accuracy close to 91%, which demonstrates the robustness
of the detection to modeling errors.
7 RELATEDWORK
As we pointed out at the beginning of the introduction, government, industry and academia have
made great efforts to combat misinformation. This section focuses on new developments on misin-
formation detection with machine-learning and data-mining methods in the research community.
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Fig. 5. Performance of QuickStop under Different Choices of Parameter c (based on the Weibo Data)
We have discussed several early detection algorithms and compared their performance with
Q_uickStop. We now focus on other related work. The algorithm developed in [31] detects whether
a post is similar to one of the posts (topics) that are known to be misinformation; and declares it as
misinformation if so. A line of work [13, 14, 40] analyzes similar models and knowledge/content-
based detection algorithms. These approaches are effective for detecting whether a post is asso-
ciated with misinformation already identified, but not suitable for detecting new misinformation.
[2, 9, 27, 35] exploit open fact-checking sources (such as DPpedia, Wikipedia, etc) to validate the
truthfulness of news articles. Viewpoints of users towards news articles such as “like” and “dislike”
have also been used in the literature to infer the veracity of a news article. For example, [39] clas-
sifies Facebook posts as hoax or non-hoaxes based on the set of users who “liked” them. The work
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Fig. 6. Performance of QuickStop with the synthetic Data with classification errors
[16] uses a topic model to discover viewpoint values from tweets and evaluated the credibility of
relevant posts based on these viewpoints.
In [4], a comprehensive data-mining approach has been proposed for determining the verac-
ity of social media contents. They considered four categories of features: message-based, user-
based, topic-based, and propagation-based features to study information credibility, and proposed
a PageRank-like credibility analysis method to verify the credibility of twitter events. The features
used in [4] have later been used in other papers [12, 21, 45]. In [17], the authors argued that fea-
tures vary over time. They reported that linguistic features are effective for detecting rumor even
at the early stage of information spreading. A model for time-varying features has been proposed
in [24]. [44] explores the use of the features of the message propagation trees for detecting misin-
formation. [8] analyzes six categories of features: comprehensibility, sentiment, time-orientation,
quantitative details, writing style, and topic. [10] analyzes users’ stance in their tweets to evaluate
the credibility of information. [5] studies the characteristics of users who often post misinforma-
tion, and proposes that after identifying these users, a news article is likely to be misinformation
if it spreads among these users. [42] proposes a misinformation detection algorithm with dynamic
time wrapping and hidden Markov models based on three categories of features (linguistic, user
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identities and temporal propagation related features). Recently, deep neural network (CNN, RNN,
and FNN) based methods have also been used for misinformation detection [22, 32].
Users play the central role in information diffusion in social networks. Their social engagements
such as sharing, forwarding, commenting are considered to be auxiliary information for improv-
ing fake news detection. [41] uses users’ flags of fake news as signals and leverages community
for misinformation detection by learning the users’ flagging accuracy. Online social network users
who intentionally spread misinformation can be divided into three categories: (1) bots, software
apps that run automated scripts5 (2) trolls, persons who like to provoke others, and (3) cyborgs6,
accounts registered to run automated programs that mimic human behaviors [36]. [6, 34] ana-
lyze the behavior patterns of bots and trolls in misinformation propagation. In [7], an automated
method is proposed for classifying the users into the three categories mentioned above. In [29],
bot detection is studied. [37] analyzes the users’ role in spreading information and concludes that
(1) some specific users are more likely to believe in misinformation than real news; (2) these users
have different features form other users. These two key observations motivated the edge-based
model considered in this paper. [1] proposes a method for measuring user credibility in informa-
tion spreading for misinformation detection. The spread of rumors and misinformation has also
been studied in [11, 15, 43], where it has been shown that misinformation and news have dif-
ferent spreading patterns and structures. In this paper, we consider both edge profiles (the edge
classification) and spreading patterns (the Markovian spreading model) inQ_uickStop to design a
highly efficient misinformation detection algorithm. Different from existing work, Q_uickStop is
an optimal stopping algorithm that optimizes the number of observations in realtime and makes
the quickest decision on misinformation detection. Finally, recent algorithms for distinguishing
epidemics from random infection (e.g., [28]) and for locating information sources (e.g., [33]) can
also help detect misinformation. A comprehensive review of diffusion source localization can be
found in [47].
8 CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a quickest misinformation detection algorithm, namedQ_uickStop. We
formulated the problem as an optimal stopping problem with a asymmetric cost function towards
misinformation. We proved that the problem is a Markov optimal stopping problem and showed
that the solution is a threshold-based stopping rule based on the martingale theory. Our numerical
results with a real-world data demonstrated thatQ_uickStop outperforms existing algorithms even
though the latter use 10 times (sometimes 50 times) more observations and use more features.
Our numerical evaluation with the synthetic data showed that the algorithm is robust to edge
classification errors.
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A APPENDICES
A.1 Proof of Theorem 3.1
We first show that E[cT IH1] = E [cTΠT ] when T is a stopping time.
E[cT IH1] = E[E[cT IH1 |T ]]
=
∞∑
k=1
ckE
[
IH1 |T = k
]
Pr(T = k).
Since T is a stopping time based on Z1, · · · ,ZT , we further have
E
[
IH1 |T = k
]
= E
[
E
[
IH1 |Z1, . . . ,Zk
]
|T = k
]
= E [Πk |T = k] .
Therefore, we have
E[cT IH1 ] =
∞∑
k=1
ckE [Πk |T = k]Pr(T = k) = E [cTΠT ] .
For anyT ∈ T , it is well known (see for example [30]) that
inf
δT
ce (δT ) = E [min{cIIΠT , cI(1 − ΠT )}] .
We next present the proof tailored for our problem for the completeness of the paper.
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Note that the equation is obvious when π1 = 0 or π1 = 1, so we only consider the case π1 ∈ (0, 1).
Recall that
ce (δT )
=(1 − π1)cI Pr(δT = 1|H0) + π1cII Pr(δT = 0|H1)
=cI Pr(δT = 1,H0) + cII Pr(δT = 0,H1)
=
∞∑
k=1
(cI Pr(δT = 1,H0 |T = k) + cII Pr(δT = 0,H1 |T = k))Pr (T = k)
=
∞∑
k=1
(cI Pr(δk = 1,H0 |T = k) + cII Pr(δk = 0,H1 |T = k))Pr (T = k)
=
∞∑
k=1
(
cIE
[
E
[
Iδk=1IH0 |Z1, · · · ,Zk
]
|T = k
]
+
cIIE
[
E
[
Iδk=0IH1 |Z1, · · · ,Zk
]
|T = k
] )
Pr (T = k)
=
∞∑
k=1
E
[ (
cIIδk (Z1, · · · ,Zk )=1(1 − Πk ) + cIIIδk (Z1, · · · ,Zk )=0Πk
) T = k]
× Pr (T = k)
≥(a)
∞∑
k=1
E [min {cI(1 − Πk ), cIIΠk }|T = k] Pr (T = k)
= E [min {cI(1 − ΠT ), cIIΠT }] ,
where the inequality (a) becomes equality when the algorithm declaresH1 when cI(1−ΠT ) ≤ cIIΠT
and declares H0 otherwise.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
We define the following value function for n ≥ 1
sn(π , z) = inf
T ∈T,T ≥n
E [д(ΠT ) + cTΠT |Πn = π ,Zn = z] .
Then sn(π , z) is the minimum expected total cost if one is only allowed to stop at or after time step
n given the state at n. Note T = {T ∈ T : T ≥ 1}. Then the minimum expected total cost over the
prior π0 is
s∗1 , inf
T ∈T
E [д(ΠT ) + cTΠT ] =
1
4
3∑
z=0
s1(π0, z),
where we use the fact that Π1 = Π0 = π0 as the first observation Z1 does not provide any informa-
tion about the type of the information.
Now according to the optimality principle of dynamic programming,
sk (π , z) = min {д(π ) + ckπ , E [sk+1(Πk+1,Zk+1)| Πk = π ,Zk = z]} ,
where {Πk } is a random process defined by {Zk } as in equation (2).
We next show that {Πk } is a martingale with respect to {Zk }. Define Fk = σ (Z1, · · · ,Zk ), which
is the σ -algebra generated by Z1, . . . , Zk . We have
E [Πk+1 |Fk ] =
3∑
z=0
E [Πk+1 |Fk ,Zk+1 = z] Pr(Zk+1 = z |Fk ).
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Since
Pr(Zk+1 = z |Fk )
= Pr(Zk+1 = z |Fk ,H1) Pr(H1 |Fk ) + Pr(Zk+1 = z |Fk ,H0) Pr(H0 |Fk )
=α1(Zk+1 = z |Zk )Πk + α0(Zk+1 = z |Zk )(1 − Πk ),
we have
E [Πk+1 |Fk ]
=
∑
z
Πkα1(Zk+1 = z |Zk )
Πkα1(Zk+1 = z |Zk ) + (1 − Πk )α0(Zk+1 = z |Zk )
× (α1(Zk+1 = z |Zk )Πk + α0(Zk+1 = z |Zk )(1 − Πk ))
=
∑
z
Πkα1(Zk+1 = z |Zk )
=Πk .
For n ≥ 1 let Π′
k
= Πk+n−1 and Z
′
k
= Zk+n−1 for all k ≥ 1. Then
sn(π , z)
= inf
T ∈T
T−n+1≥1
E [д(ΠT ) + c(T − n + 1)ΠT + c(n − 1)ΠT |Πn = π ,Zn = z]
= inf
T ′∈T
T ′≥1
E[д(Π′T ′) + cT
′
Π
′
T ′ |Π
′
1 = π ,Z
′
1 = z] + c(n − 1)π
= s1(π , z) + c(n − 1)π .
In other words, because the posterior probability {Πk } is a martingale with respect to the observa-
tions {Zk }, every time step passed before time n (when one is allowed to stop and make a decision)
incurs a constant additive cost of cπ to the minimum expected total cost.
Now define
s(z)(π ) = s1(π , z) − cπ . (10)
Then for any k ≥ 1,
s(z)(π )
= sk (π , z) − ckπ
= min
{
д(π ), E
[
s(Zk+1)(Πk+1) + c(k + 1)Πk+1
Πk = π ,Zk = z
]
− ckπ
}
= min
{
д(π ), E
[
s(Zk+1)(Πk+1)
Πk = π ,Zk = z
]
+ cπ
}
.
Hence s as defined in (10) satisfies the Bellman equation (9).
Note that д(π ) + ckπ is the cost when the information type is declared at iteration k given
Πk = π , and E
[
s(z)(Πk+1)
Πk = π ,Zk = z] + c(k + 1)π is the minimum cost the information type
is declared after iteration k given Πk = π . Therefore, at optimal stopping time T , we have
s(z)(π ) + ckπ = д(π ) + ckπ
i.e.,
s(z)(π ) = д(π ).
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Furthermore, if s(z)(π ) = д(π ) and cIIπ < cI(1−π ), then s
(z)(π ) = cIIπ , so the information is declared
to be news; otherwise, it is declared to bemisinformation. Therefore, after solving s(z))(π ),we have
π
(z)
l
= sup
π
{
π : s(z)(π ) = cIIπ
}
,
and
π
(z)
u = inf
π
{
π : s(z)(π ) = cI(1 − π )
}
.
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